The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security

by Sparrow, Bartholomew

Overview: From his early days as an Air Force fighter pilot in 1947, to his later role as an advisor to Presidents, Brent Scowcroft played a central advisory role in many of the key US strategic decisions, and was not shy about giving strategic analysis and advice that his bosses did not always want to hear. But one of the key aspects of this story – the first comprehensive examination of Scowcroft’s career, was the role this “loyal rebel” played in quietly helping to repair the damage when American foreign policy occasionally went awry.

• The introduction offers a description of what strategist do, and how their roles are different than those of the tactician, even if both together are essential to success. What is your definition of strategy and the role of the strategist vs. the tactician or the commander? What might be differing descriptions of strategy and tactics that we can compare with Sparrow’s description? What personal aptitudes and experiences made it possible for Scowcroft to act as a strategist, and how well are we seeking and cultivating these skills in today’s Air Force?
• In Part 1 (Chapters 1-5, “Air Force Officer”), Sparrow describes Scowcroft’s personal history from birth to his appointment President Nixon’s military assistant in 1972. What were the key educational and developmental experiences that prepared him for this role? What role did mentors play in this journey? How did Scowcroft respond to occasional failures and obstacles in his journey that threw him off the standard Air Force career path? What personal qualities or practices gained the attention of those who kept them from becoming fatal to his advancement, and gave him the credibility to hold the advisory positions he was given?
• In Part II (Chapters 6-13, “The Nixon and Ford Administrations”). The author describes Scowcroft’s rises from being a military advisor to the President as a colonel to Deputy National Security Advisor, retiring as a Lieutenant General to assume the role of National Security Advisor. What skills and competencies made Scowcroft successful in his role as a military advisor? What combinations of aptitude, skill, knowledge, and ethics were required to succeed as a military officer in the highly politically charged atmosphere of a White House? How did Scowcroft stay current with the pace of events, and effectively communicate with senior leaders who had to make decisions under conditions of intense time pressure and high levels of oppositional scrutiny? While serving as the National Security Advisor how did Scowcroft use his personal leadership style and the tools of bureaucracy to change both the atmosphere and the operations of the NSC?
• In Part III (Chapters 14-16, “The Carter and Reagan Years”). Sparrow describes how Scowcroft does consulting, publishing and committee work for President Ford after he loses his election and a new national security advisor is named. What allows Scowcroft to remain relevant and “in the game” regarding strategy after he leaves public service. In what ways is Scowcroft able to use his position as a Reagan Administration outsider to greater effect than he might have as an insider? What are your thoughts on his reported statement to Newsweek reporter Robert Parry (pgs. 258-259), and Sparrow’s conclusion about Scowcroft’s ethical judgment regarding the protection of the President and institutions of government during the Iran-Contra scandal? What are your thoughts about his opinion of the role of the National Security Advisor?
• In Part IV (Chapters 17-27, “The Bush Administration 1989-1993”. The author describes Scowcroft return as President George Herbert Walker Bush’s National Security Advisor. How did Scowcroft characterize his role as the National Security Advisor distinctly from the President’s other advisors? What steps did Scowcroft take to solidify that role and correct past NSC dysfunctions? How did Scowcroft manage collaboration and tensions between his staff and the other key players in the White House staff? Congress? The Department of State? Department of Defense? The interagency? The media? What do you believe were the strengths and weaknesses of the Bush-Scowcroft “new world order” approach to foreign policy, and what did Scowcroft mean by “the resumption of history”? (Pgs. 482-483)
• In Part V (Chapters 38-31, “Citizen Statesman”. Sparrow details Scowcroft’s effort to create his own consulting firm working with multi-national companies, and takes leadership roles in various influential think tanks and advisory groups, including helping President George W. Bush by heading the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. How was Scowcroft able to use his reputation, political skills, bureaucratic savvy, and insider knowledge to get things done in these positions? Why was his advice against invading Iraq not heeded in 2002-2003, and how did his “truth to power” moment affect his influence in the policy world and eventual legacy? What allowed Scowcroft to continue to work to help with the aftermath of the invasion after this very public falling out with the Bush administration and his former protégégé, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice? Which of Scowcroft’s methods and approaches may indicate best practices in the difficult challenge of choosing between short term “repair service behavior” driven by the crisis of the day, and working on the longer term fixes required to address core problems driving multiple crises?