Space Wars: The First Six Hours of World War III

Michael Coumatos, William Scott, and William J. Birnes

Overview: Space Wars provides an accessible entry point for beginning to understand the complexities of the space domain as well as its fundamental importance to the United States. Coumatos, Scott, and Birnes take the reader inside U.S. Strategic Command, where top military commanders, space-company executives, and U.S. intelligence experts are conducting a DEADSATS II wargame, exploring how the loss of critical satellites could lead to nuclear war. The authors draw some interesting parallels with the maritime domain. Just as the US seeks to perpetuate from—indeed benefits from—freedom of the seas—so, too, does the US seek to apply this notion to space. Space Wars describes a near-future nuclear nightmare that terrorists will relish but politicians prefer to ignore.

• In chapter 1, “Deadsats,” note the integrated relationship between cyber and space on the first page of the chapter (21). Later on, the authors describe a STRATCOM that struggles to balance all of its responsibilities (24). Consider this in the context of arguments for a Space Corps. What arguments can be made for and against a more independent space force?
• Chapter 2, “Zeroing In” opens with a friendly fire incident in which a pilot chooses to trust GPS over inertial navigation. It also shows some of the consequences of a world where GPS satellites cannot be relied on as well as where redundancies are built into the system. Whatever your AFSC, how might the loss of communication or an overreliance on technology or the failure of space assets affect or challenge your decision making?
• Chapter 3, “Wargame’s No Game” introduces the reader to some of the key questions regarding successful war gaming. At a time when the Department of Defense is wrestling with the future of artificial intelligence, the authors argue that the “human mind could essentially outperform the best of computer models” (75). Do you agree, and, if so, how long will this continue to be the case?
• “Out of the Black” delves into the weaponization of space by having the US consider using tungsten rods in a covert attack (117). Should the US lead the way in the weaponization of space with the kind of technology described in this chapter?
• The authors expound on Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, in chapter 6, “A Hole in the Sky.” Particularly the idea of “cheng and ch’i, the traditional and the unexpected, the balance of opposites, especially asymmetries that are organic to the practice of warfare” (154-155). Although the US gained its independence by learning how to fight asymmetrically, it has perhaps forgotten some of those lessons because of its general preponderance of power over the last century. What happens if the US loses space and other capabilities that have enabled decades of military superiority?
• After the loss of the International Space Station’s astronauts previously, chapter 9, “Casualties” finds the former fighter-pilot general envisioning a world of “space fighter[s]” that would defend satellites, positions on the Moon, or other assets (210). How does the general’s background—and that of some of the authors—affect his thinking? Do orbital mechanics, for example, make such a vision likely or the best option?
• Chapter 12, “Shahab,” highlights the importance of America’s perceived negative image in the world in the context of being the recipient of information warfare. The authors depict the Iranians nimbly creating a powerful narrative that helps their cause, even as they launch a nuclear weapon. In an increasingly inter-connected world, these narratives are of great importance, and the US is battling narratives crafted by near-peer adversaries all the time. How well is the US prepared to fight back with counter-narratives?
• Shifting from space wars into media wars, chapter 15, “Coming to Grips,” questions the utility of public affairs officers for anything more than ensuring the military does not release classified information. What are the capabilities and limitations of USAF public affairs? Does it do enough to shape powerful narratives? The authors hint at some difference between narratives that provide “transparency” and those that provide “spin” (316), is it an either-or choice?
• Chapter 16, “Rods from God,” depicts the use of a spaceplane to drop tungsten rods from space onto an Iranian nuclear facility in this chapter. Then, the spaceplane conducts a reconnaissance mission to examine Chinese nanosats. Is this kind of strategic bombing raid applied to space useful and realistic or does it rest on a paradigm that puts the fighter/bomber pilot at the center of Air Force institutional culture?
• In chapter 17, “An Old China Hand,” the authors seek to reveal insights into Chinese strategic thinking. For example, they describe the Chinese tendency to encircle, embrace, and then absorb its enemies (353). It is hard not to see some of these tendencies in the way that China has acted in the South China Sea in recent years. Still, perhaps the novel should be a starting place for seeking out greater knowledge about how China thinks rather than an ending point. For example, what does it mean to be “Taoists first and always” (352)?