The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin

Steven Lee Myers

Overview: Myers has written a richly detailed, thorough, and balanced account of Vladimir Putin. This work demonstrates admirable judgement in controversial areas, disdaining the excessively conspiratorial accounts of his worst critics, but fully revealing his cold and callous nature, his distrust and intolerance for opposition. His chronological approach provides an engaging portrait of Putin’s psychological development, the social and historical forces that shaped his worldview, and the contingent character of events that initially propelled him into power. In an easy and accessible writing style, Myers paints a tapestry filled with vignettes of a rich array of personalities, which gives the reader many powerful lessons in leadership, success, and statecraft.

• In Part I, Myers repeatedly contrasts the personable, charismatic mentors who promoted Putin in his career with his own dour, initially “withdrawn and uncommunicative” demeanor, and often brash indifference to risk (p. 19, 27). Myers portrays Putin’s experiences of “catastrophe”—the collapse and disappearance of the state that he loved and served, his repeated loss of jobs and patrons, and his house burning down. What do you learn from this book about avoiding superficial judgements of someone’s fitness for responsibilities based on the appearance of attractive versus unimpressive personality traits? How does Putin respond, adapt, or adjust to these crises and losses (p. 50)? What lessons might we draw from this aspect of the biography?
• In Part II, Myers foreshadows an important theme, that Putin deeply understood Russian popular political culture, its strong support for central authority, and yearning for stability and prestige, even at the expense of individual freedoms. He describes the protracted difficulties experienced by policymakers and citizens in shaping a new state apparatus in Russia, after the collapse of the USSR. How does understanding the political culture of one’s own nation—and of our adversaries—help us avoid errors and find successful strategies? What lessons should an alert policy analyst draw regarding the hazards of “regime change”? What should a military planner expect regarding the human and financial costs, the time required for stabilization, the types of personalities likely to take power in the aftermath of a political vacuum, and the nature of outside support that other states can provide?
• Myers reports that as a deputy city manager, “Putin developed a reputation for competence, effectiveness, and absolute, ruthless loyalty to [St. Petersburg Mayor] Sobchak” (p. 84), as well as his meticulous and “militantly studious” work. What lessons might an international security analyst extract from this regarding the probable direction of his domestic and foreign policy orientation? Would he expect and demand a reciprocal efficiency and loyalty from his administration, and even his citizens?
• Myers argues that Putin distrusted almost everyone except his friends from the “power organs” the siloviki (p. 91). From what historical events and conditions did this distrust develop? How did these men shape his world view? What consequences does Myers trace, in terms of both domestic policy and foreign policy, flowing from this distrust, which grew into paranoia?
• In this story, Putin always remembers any act of loyalty, and never forgave a betrayal. Myers attributes to him an “essentially Russian understanding that assistance…came through connections, the exchange of favors” (p. 92). How did he use that perspective to build a network of loyal supporters (p. 118)? How can a leader today draw lessons from this story? Does this offer any insight for building international cooperation and partnerships?
• In Part III, Myers relates as the head of the FSB, Putin “established a monopoly of information” on Russian business oligarchs, enabling him to control them by blackmail (202). He “obsessively” followed television news reports. What vulnerabilities does this create for Putin personally, and for the system of government? On what social and economic conditions does this power depend? How might changing technology affect this? What weaknesses does a strategy based on such a worldview face?
• In exchange for supporting US operations in Afghanistan, Putin originally hoped for a “grand bargain” (211) from the US and NATO, protecting Russia, and giving it extraterritorial rights over Slavic populations and countries in its “near abroad.” However, US actions in Serbia, Georgia, Iraq and Ukraine fed Russians’ paranoia, leading to a consolidation of anti-Americanism. Despite demonstrating a thorough absorption of their security briefings on Putin, numerous officials, from Madeleine Albright, President George W. Bush, and others came away from their initial meetings with Putin charmed and disarmed. Given the reality of American political culture, how might American policy-makers have reduced this destructive turn of convictions? How did this create dangers for international security? What lessons might military planners and policymakers take to avoid future deception by foreign leaders?
• In Parts IV and V, Myers notes that Putin “seized Crimea from Ukraine because he could,” and he believed that as a superpower, Russia had the legal and moral authority to do so (465). Putin’s friends struggled to explain the evolution of his character and could only conclude, “Power changes people” (428). What political strategies offer the best prospects for protecting international security in the face of such a blatantly “Realist” approach? What strategy did Sarkozy use to persuade Putin to cease firing in Georgia? Knowing that we all weigh risk versus reward in our everyday lives, how can we fight developing flawed or destructive conclusion to what might appear to be facts (fact: Putin is a likable guy in person)?