Escalation & Deterrence in the Second Space Age

Todd Harrison, Zack Cooper, Kaitlyn Johnson, & Thomas G. Roberts

Overview: On October 4th, many in the space community celebrated the 61st anniversary of the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 1 which was the first human-made object to orbit the Earth. Since that time the United States has grappled with President Kennedy’s question of whether space will be “a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war.” A recent report, Escalation & Deterrence in the Second Space Age, by the Center for Strategic & International Studies provides a thorough account of the journey of space, from the unexplored heavens to a contested domain, specifically focusing on escalation and deterrence philosophies. The report delineates between the First Space Age (1957-1990) which is dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Second Space Age (1991-Present) where the space aperture is opened to other countries as well as private industry. The bulk of the report investigates whether traditional escalation and deterrence theories are still relevant in the Second Space Age by utilizing historical references, theoretical perspectives, and a tabletop exercise.

With President Trump’s call for the establishment of a Space Force by 2020, this report is not only timely but also a necessary catalyst to a long-needed military discussion on how traditional deterrence policies might need to be reexamined as it applies to the asymmetries of space.

• Chapter 1, “The Evolution of Space as a Contested Domain.” The report begins with Sputnik 1 as the opening salvo of space being seen as a warfighting domain in the First Space Age. It was an age dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union as evidenced by the pair being responsible for 93 percent of all satellites being launched into space. Likewise, both countries viewed military space systems as strategic in nature because they were built to support nuclear missions. Therefore, any conflict in space was seen as a potential provocation to nuclear conflict and thus was an inherent deterrent. The Second Space Age coincided with the end of the Cold War and sees other countries as well as commercial entities begin to see opportunities in space. By 2016, the global space economy has grown to $323B annually. This exponential growth has led to space being more “diverse, disruptive, disordered, and dangerous” than ever before. Should the US be worried that since 2014 the majority of satellites have not come from the United States? What areas of the USAF doctrine must be changed to account for the asymmetries of space? Should the DOD partner with commercial industries to leverage commercial space technologies?
• Chapter 2, “Threats to Space Systems” are categorized into four specific categories: kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electromagnetic, and cyber. These threats can range from the very visible like a missile strike on a satellite to the more innocuous like a cyber attack to intercept data from a space system. Further complicating matters in space is the extreme remoteness of space which causes difficulties with the development of military strategy for space. Should kinetic physical attacks in uninhabited space be viewed the same as if it occurred in a highly populated area? Is it possible to establish borders in space? Why is it necessary to have an international standard for attacks on space systems?
• Chapter 3, “Space Deterrence and Escalation” seeks to explain how classical deterrence theory relates to the space domain. For the uninitiated, deterrence is keeping an adversary from taking an action by instilling fear of the consequences. While there are many similarities between space and the other domains, the fact remains that no major conflict has ever occurred in space making it difficult for military thought leaders to know how best to apply deterrence principles to space conflict. However, the report does offer the nuclear deterrence theory as the most useful benchmark for space deterrence. What is the difference between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment? How might the US implement a catalytic space strategy? Why is it important for the USAF to develop a more robust space deterrence strategy?
• Chapter 4, “Lessons from a Space Crisis Exercise” is a fascinating review of a tabletop exercise or wargame that featured three scenarios with a potential for space conflict, exploring the resulting actions and unintended consequences. An important takeaway from the wargames was the importance of having redundant capabilities once space capabilities were eroded. Additionally, teams were more willing to utilize kinetic attacks in all other domains but space. Most interesting was the finding that teams were unable to quickly distinguish between strategic and tactical space systems. What are some ways for the USAF to increase resiliency in our space capabilities? Why were teams hesitant to deploy kinetic attacks in space? What is the importance of wargaming space conflict? How should a space force postured itself to ensure space dominance?